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Abstract 
This study uses a vector autoregressive (VAR) model to examine the impact of oil prices on 
household final consumption expenditure in Sweden. Due to that international oil prices have 
been falling since mid-2014, and due to Sweden’s assumed decreased oil dependency, it is of 
interest to estimate this effect, and whether it has reduced. The empirical results suggest that 
the price of oil does significantly affect household consumption in Sweden. It is indicated that 
an increase in international oil prices is associated with a decrease in household consumption. 
Furthermore, there are indications that the effect of oil prices on consumption was higher 
before the mid-1990s than in succeeding periods.    
Keywords: oil prices, VAR model, household, consumption, Sweden.  
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1. Introduction 
The global economy has since mid-2014 experienced one of the sharpest declines in the price 
of oil since the financial crisis of 2008. This drop has, according to The Economist (2014), 
been caused by shifts in both demand and supply. The world’s slackening economy, and 
delayed recoveries in Europe and Japan, are holding back the demand of oil. Simultaneously, 
there has been a large supply shock due to the increasing production of oil, mainly owing to 
America who has since early 2013 produced roughly 1-2 million barrels per day more than the 
previous year. Together, these contrasting shocks have shifted both the demand and supply, 
which in turn has triggered a significant drop in the price of oil. 
By reason of this recent development of falling oil prices, and its argued effect on the global 
economy, it is clearly of interest to study this topic more thoroughly. However, as a departure 
from the majority of studies conducted on the subject, the aim of this study is to explore the 
effects that are passed on to the average households. Household final consumption 
expenditure is normally the largest GDP component.1 For instance, approximately 50% of 
GDP in Sweden for the past five decades is related to consumption, according to The World 
Bank (2014). Due to that numerous empirical studies, see Odusami (2010, p. 861), have 
shown that the main mechanism by which oil price increases affects aggregate output is 
through the consumption channel, it is of interest to study the impact on consumption in 
Sweden caused by increases in international oil prices.  
Hence, the purpose of this thesis is to examine the impact of international oil prices on 
consumption in Sweden, and also whether this effect has decreased since the mid-1990s.  
Sweden has in recent years experienced a particularly low inflation rate. This became even 
more evident when Sweden’s central bank, the Riksbank (2014, p. 44), in late October 
decided to lower its key interest rate, the repo rate, to a historically low zero percent. 
Simultaneously, as indicated by a global status report from REN21 (2014, p. 29), the country 
has consistently attempted to reduce its dependence on fossil fuels. The country strives for 
“fossil fuel-free” roads by 2030, with road vehicles powered primarily by biofuels or 
electricity. The ongoing campaign of walking, cycling and public transportation has also been 
an important step towards its vision of an energy supply system with zero net atmospheric 
greenhouse gas emission by 2050. Furthermore, hybrid transportation options are also 
                                                          
1 “Household final consumption expenditure” is from now on simply referred to as “consumption”. 
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emerging as a substitute to fossil fuel driven public transports, such as electric-diesel and 
biodiesel-natural gas buses. As a result, the country’s oil dependency has experienced a 
reduction. Since international oil prices are assumed to affect the GDP growth rate of an 
economy, this implies that one might expect a reduction of oil price shocks’ effect on 
consumer spending in Sweden.   
Figure 1. Europe Brent spot price for the period January 1980 – August 2014. Adjusted for inflation. 
 
Oil price fluctuations and its effect on the macroeconomic performance has been a well-
studied subject for decades. For example, Hamilton asserted by the beginning of the 1980s 
that oil shocks were a contributing factor to the poor performance of the U.S. economy that 
began in 1973, i.e. that there existed a significant negative correlation between rises in the 
price of oil and economic growth. His theory, see Hamilton (1983), has since then found 
support by many scholars who have studied the subject, such as Mork (1989) who claimed 
that the negative correlation with oil price increases did indeed exist and was not simply a 
product of Hamilton’s data. He continued by adding to the theory that there seemed to be an 
asymmetric relationship between the two variables; a theory that also has attracted a lot of 
support.  
However, since the beginning of the 21st century, there has been a notable increase in the 
amount of studies which claims that the relationship might not be as strong as previously 
thought. According to Blanchard, Amighini and Giavazzi (2010, p. 180), this criticism has its 
roots in the following question: If the oil price increases in the 1970s were associated with 
stagflation, why did it have so little apparent effect on the economy in the 2000s?  
Two hypotheses have appeared as reasonable: (1) Workers are today less powerful in 
bargaining than they were in the 1970s. As a result, workers have been more willing to accept 
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wage reductions and thus limiting the upward shift of the aggregate supply curve caused by 
oil price increases. (2) Monetary policy is very much different today than it was in the 1970s. 
Since peoples’ expectations affect the price level in the economy, the aggregate supply curve 
was enhanced in the 1970s due to the fact that people started expecting higher prices. Today, 
expectations are that the monetary system will prevent changing oil prices from affecting the 
price level, and thus the effect on the economy will be dampened. 
While the studies of the relationship between international oil prices and its effect on 
economic growth has been notable by a vast amount of literature; the impact of international 
oil prices on consumption have merely recently started being a focus of study. Thus, only a 
handful of directly related papers have to this date investigated this effect. Mehra and Petersen 
(2005) were one of the first to conduct a study on the subject. Inspired by the works of Mork 
as regards to oil price increases, their article reported empirical evidence indicating that oil 
price shocks have a negative effect on consumption. Furthermore, they found that oil price 
increases that take place after a period which has been characterized by its stability in terms of 
oil prices, matter more than oil price increases that reverse earlier declines, and also that oil 
price decreases did not affect consumption. Their empirical strategy used to isolate the effect 
of an oil price increase on consumption was to look at the direct effect of an “net oil price 
increase” (the percentage change from the highest oil price reached over a particular amount 
of time) on the consumption beyond which could be accounted by disposable income, 
household net worth and the short-term interest rate. A difference from both previous studies 
and later studies was that in estimating the impact of oil prices, they focused on the price of 
gasoline faced by consumers rather than the price of crude oil faced by producers. 
Using a similar method as Mehra and Petersen, Broadstock and Zhang (2014) studied several 
economies in Asia and also found empirical evidence suggesting the existence of a nonlinear 
asymmetric correlation between oil prices and consumption. The same conclusion was 
reached by Wang (2013) when studying the top economies of the OECD. However, unlike 
previous authors, he used a logistic smooth transition model to examine this relationship.  
Odusami (2010) departed further by adopting a completely different approach in studying the 
relationship: instead of incorporating oil prices into a consumption function, he argued that oil 
price movements affect the consumption of U.S. households through the wealth channel. 
Edelstein and Kilian (2009) focused on the general level of retail energy prices and 
constructed, for each consumption aggregate, the response of consumption to purchasing 
power shocks from bivariate vector autoregressive (VAR) models. They showed that energy 
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prices have historically been an important factor in explaining U.S. real consumption growth, 
but at the same time not a dominant factor.  
The limited amount of studies mentioned above is essentially the majority of the literature 
made on the subject to this date. Even though covering a vast amount of developed economies 
combined; none of these studies have estimated the effect of oil prices on consumption in 
Swedish. Thus, due to the significance of oil price changes effect on the global economy, the 
relevance of the subject due to recent oil price drops, the scarcity of studies on the specific 
subject, and Sweden’s ambiguous response to these fluctuations due to a reduced oil 
dependency: it is of clear interest to examine the impact of oil prices on consumption in 
Swedish. Furthermore, due to that most empirical studies have indicated on an asymmetrical 
relationship, this study focuses primarily on positive oil price shocks.  
On the overall, the empirical analysis in this study imply that changes in the price of crude oil 
does have a significant effect on consumer spending in Sweden. By applying a vector 
autoregressive (VAR) model, it is implied that a positive oil price shock has a negative impact 
on consumption. There is also some signs that imply that increasing oil prices has a lesser 
effect on consumption in Sweden post-1997 relative to the period 1980-1997. Whether this 
change is truly significant or not, or whether it really is due to changes in the oil dependency 
or not is, however, harder to determine and thus requires further research.  
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an empirical background to 
help one understand both the determining factors of changing oil prices and how fluctuating 
oil prices might affect the global economy. Section 3 provides the theoretical background for 
this study, where, firstly, the variables that are to be included in the model are established and, 
secondly, an explanation of how these variables might affect consumption is specified. 
Section 4 is the empirical analysis of this study, which includes data highlights, explanation of 
computed model and results. Section 5 concludes the study.  
2. Background 
2.1 The Determinants of Oil Prices  
To understand the determining factors for oil price fluctuations, it is useful to study price 
shocks over the past five decades. According to the European Central Bank (2010, pp. 76-77), 
the United States position as a marginal supplier of oil, i.e. a supplier which is able to both 
influence prices and balance the market by changing the amount it produces, began to wear 
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off during the 1960s. At the same time, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) started to experiment with its recently attained market power, which caused the oil 
price shocks of 1973 and 1979. These reductions in OPEC’s supply and operable capability, 
caused higher prices and lower global oil demand, particularly in OECD countries. 
Consequently, this situation generated incentives for non-OPEC countries to increase oil 
supply, e.g. shale oil extraction, which in turn weakened OPEC’s position as a marginal 
supplier. The cartel members, who were not willingly going to give up their status as market 
leader, started to exceed the agreed quotas, which caused prices to gradually drop. 
However, from the second half of the 1990s, oil prices became considerably more volatile. 
The increased demand from non-OECD emerging economies such as China, India and the 
Middle East, prompted a rise in the price of crude oil. Sequentially, future oil supply forecasts 
revealed a reason of concern; the growth in non-OPEC crude oil production seemed to 
stagnate from the end of 2004 and onwards. The possibility for amplified non-OPEC oil 
production was constrained by geological limitations, and the limited possibility of extra 
capacity in most OPEC countries contributed to market tension. This tension was slowly 
disturbed by a combination of a decline of economic growth in leading advanced economies, 
the beginning of the financial crisis and the following drop in global activity, which further 
caused a decrease in the demand for oil in emerging economies. OPEC, in an attempt to limit 
the falling oil prices, responded by declaring a decrease in production of approximately 5 
million barrels per day. Beginning by the second quarter of 2009, prices began to recover and 
fluctuated at around USD 75 per barrel (about 600 SEK in 2013 prices). 
As mentioned in the introduction, factors such as the decreasing growth rate of the global 
economy, late recoveries in Europe and Japan and the increased production of oil in non-
OPEC countries have all contributed to falling prices on the international market. OPEC’s 
attempt to limit the decline of oil prices was to some degree fruitful, prices increased steadily 
between the end of 2010 and the beginning of 2014, but has nonetheless been disrupted by 
these shifts in both demand and supply for crude oil. Data from U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (2014) clearly demonstrates that prices have since mid-June 2014 fallen from 
USD 115 to USD 79 (about 643 SEK in 2013 prices) in less than six months. 
2.2 The Impact of Oil Prices on the Economic Activity 
Due to a lack of natural endowments, a very limited amount of oil is produced in Europe. 
Nevertheless, oil has remained the main source of energy ever since it surpassed coal and 
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other solid fuels in the 1960s. Consequently, the dependency ratio (i.e., net imports to total 
supply) is very high for a lot of European countries. Oil derives its significance both from its 
role in private consumption (transportation and heating fuel) and from its role as a production 
factor (logistics, distribution and use in the production of chemicals). It is particularly a 
crucial source of fuel for transportation, where it, according to the ECB (2014, p. 81), 
accounts for over 95% of the energy consumption within the sector. Furthermore, it has an 
impact on other energy prices, such as natural gas and coal, since they are substitutes for each 
other. Though, one has to keep in mind that its importance as an energy source has gradually 
fallen as a result of a combination of factors; mainly due to the increased production of other 
sources such as natural gas and nuclear power stations, technological innovations that have 
improved fuel efficiency, and certain structural alterations of the economy (e.g. “Green 
politics” larger role on the political agenda). 
Oil price fluctuations affect the economic activity mostly through the terms-of-trade, demand 
and supply channels. A rise in average import prices, due to rising oil prices, relative to export 
prices affects the terms-of-trade. For net oil-importing economies, such as the euro area, this 
might generate adverse real income and wealth effects. These effects can, according to the 
ECB (2014, p. 82), be dampened through monetary policy by either reducing savings or 
increasing borrowing. The effect of rising oil prices on demand derives from the inflationary 
effects on consumer prices, hence lowering real disposable income which in turn affects 
consumption negatively. Lastly, the effects on supply reflects the significance of oil as an 
input in the production process. In the short-run, firms ability to react to rising oil prices are 
very limited, in a lot of cases nonexistent, thus higher production costs are unavoidable. In the 
medium-run, they might respond by either changing their pricing or production behavior, 
which in turn could have contrary effects on profits, investment, employment and wages. 
However, in the long-run, oil price increases might lead to substitution effects and a decrease 
in the general energy intensity of production and consumption. 
3. Theory 
To estimate the effects of oil price fluctuations on consumption, one must first determine the 
other elements that also affect consumption. Understandably, consumption decisions depend 
on several factors. The central one is certainly income or, more specifically, disposable 
income, i.e. the income that remains after taxes have been paid and transfers from the 
government have been received. There is in other words a linear relationship between 
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disposable income and consumption: hence, when average disposable income increases, then 
so does the amount of consumption in an economy, and vice versa. This is, however, an 
unsufficient function to estimate the amount of consumption. Milton Friedman and Franco 
Modigliani, see Blanchard, Amighini and Giavazzi (2010, p. 327), developed independently a 
theory of consumption (“permanent income theory of consumption” and “life cycle theory of 
consumption” respectively), which put together imply that consumption decisions goes 
beyond current income and that consumers’ natural planning horizon is their total lifetime.  
Since the development of mentioned two theories, the behavior of aggregate consumption has 
remained a relevant subject, mainly due to consumption’s large part as a component of GDP 
and the increased availability of large consumer surveys. Blanchard, Amighini and Giavazzi 
(2010, p. 327) summarize these findings and call it the theory of the “very foresighted 
consumer”, which essentially states that current consumption (𝐶𝑡,) depends on total wealth 
(𝑊𝑡,) and current disposable income (𝑌𝐷𝑡). The term “total wealth” is equal to the sum of 
financial wealth (𝑊𝑡
𝐹), housing wealth (𝑊𝑡𝐻) and the present value of expected disposable 
income. This gives us the following consumption function: 
𝐶𝑡 = 𝐶(𝑊𝑡,𝑌𝐷𝑡) 
where 
𝑊𝑡 = 𝑊𝑡
𝐹 + 𝑊𝑡𝐻 + ∑
𝑌𝐷𝑡+1
(1 + 𝑟)𝑖
𝑇
𝑖=0
 
with the last component in the sum representing the expected present discounted value of 
disposable income. Thus, a more realistic description of an individual’s consumption 
decisions needs to take the individual’s expectations into consideration.  
A problem with the above estimated equation is that they do not account for a certain thing 
that affects every decision for a consumer; namely time. It takes time for a worker’s wage to 
undergo an increase or decrease, as well as it takes time for the housing market to change its 
general pricing level. Similarly, a decrease in the interest rate today does not necessarily 
imply that a consumer will decide to buy a new house tomorrow. This consumption decision 
might actually be put off for several months before it is executed. Hence, to properly estimate 
the effect of oil price shocks on consumer spending, one must take into account the delaying 
effect of the components that affect the amount of consumption in an economy. In other 
words, it can be very valuable to include lagged variables in the consumption function.  
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The equation used in this study is, for the above mentioned reason, roughly based on the 
empirical “life-cycle” aggregate consumption equation estimated in Mehra and Petersen 
(2005, p. 62). In their short term consumption equation, changes in current consumption 
depends on lagged values of income, wealth, the short-term nominal interest rate (FR), and oil 
prices (O), but also on lagged changes in consumption and the gap between actual and 
planned consumption (𝐶𝑝): 
∆𝐶𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐶𝑡−1
𝑝 − 𝐶𝑡−1) + 𝛽2∆𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆𝑊𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽4𝑠∆𝐶𝑡−𝑠
6
𝑠=1 + ∑ 𝛽5𝑠∆𝑂𝑡−𝑠
3
𝑠=1 +
∑ 𝛽6𝑠∆𝐹𝑅𝑡−𝑠
3
𝑠=1 , 
where, since their assumption is that current-period values of income and wealth variables are 
not observed, planned consumption depends on their known past values 
𝐶𝑡
𝑝 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑌𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑊𝑡. 
However, the main difference between the consumption function used in this study and Mehra 
and Petersen’s is that the variables for changes in consumption and the gap between actual 
and planned consumption are not included. Also, the variable for interest rate is adjusted for 
inflation and thus based on the real interest rate rather than the nominal interest rate, and the 
variable for oil prices is based on crude oil prices rather than gasoline prices faced by 
consumers. Using crude oil prices, rather than gasoline prices, allows us to account for both 
prices faced directly by consumers, and also prices faced by producers which in turn is 
assumed to affect the general pricing level. In addition, oil prices are based on Brent Blend 
due to its common role as a benchmark crude, particularly in Europe, see EIA (April 2014).  
Subsequently, having determined which variables to include in the equation for consumption, 
one must also determine how these variables might affect a household’s consumption 
decisions. First, as basic economic theory implies, it is assumed that an individual can choose 
to either consume or save the received disposable income. Proportions of amount of 
consumption and savings may vary from individual to individual. This implies that, all else 
equal, an increase in disposable income will lead to an increase in consumption, and vice 
versa. Second, it is assumed that an individual will consume more when becoming richer. 
Thus, all else equal, if a person’s wealth increases (either by increased asset value or by a 
reduction in debt) then consumption will also increase, and vice versa. Third, as is commonly 
assumed, when interest rates are increased lending becomes more expensive and saving 
becomes more profitable. Hence, all else equal, an increase in the interest rate is followed by a 
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decrease in consumer spending. Lastly, and most importantly, we must determine exactly how 
an oil price shock can affect a household’s consumption decisions. As indicated by the 
previous section, there are numerous ways of which oil prices might affect household 
consumption. Similar to previous studies such as Mehra and Petersen (2005) and Wang 
(2013), the main effects of oil price changes on consumption are assumed to work through 
two distinctive channels: real balance effect and wealth transfer effect. These channels, and 
their way of affecting the consumption of households, are generally assumed to affect 
consumers in the following way: 
Real balance effect: A common theory is that higher oil prices leads to higher gasoline 
prices, which in turn leads to a reduction in disposable income, since it is assumed that 
households spends a certain proportion of their income on gasoline. Consequently, since an 
increase is the price of oil is assumed to increase the general price level, real money balances 
held by households would in turn be negatively affected through “familiar” monetary policy 
channels, including the central bank’s counter-inflationary monetary reaction. This type of 
reaction was for instance observed no more than recently when the Swedish Riksbank (2014, 
p. 17), as a response to the unusually low inflation, which is partly attributed to the falling oil 
prices, decided to let the repo rate fall to zero percent. Furthermore, it is important to 
understand that inflation is not necessarily only caused by an increase in the general level of 
prices for goods and services domestically. Inflation can also be caused by an increase in the 
price of imports, i.e. imported inflation. This can, for instance, happen when the price of 
imports increases causes an increase in prices of domestic goods using imports as raw 
materials, which in turn causes an increase in the general prices of all goods and services.   
Wealth transfer effect: For oil-importing countries, such as Sweden, it is reasonable to 
expect a reduction in consumption as a result of an oil price increase due to the transfer of 
income from the oil-importers to the oil-exporters. The explanation behind this is essentially 
that when there is a transfer of income from an oil-importing country to an oil-exporting 
country, the disposable income rises in the oil-exporting country but falls in the oil-importing 
country, which sequentially causes an adverse effect in consumption for the oil-importer. 
However, relative to the above mentioned effect, the wealth transfer effect requires a longer 
period of time to affect consumption, since it is assumed that it takes a longer time for wages 
to adjust compared to prices. 
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4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Data 
This study uses samples of quarterly data from the first quarter of 1980 through the fourth 
quarter of 2013 to examine the influence of oil price fluctuations on consumption in Sweden.2 
Hence, the dependent variable in the model is per capita consumption, which can be defined 
as the total spending on individual goods and services by households, also counting those sold 
at below-market prices, divided by the population rate for each relevant year. The independent 
variables used in the model are: (1) per capita disposable income, defined as total income 
minus tax and other deductions, (2) per capita private sector net wealth, defined as all 
financial assets minus all financial liabilities, (3) personal sector real interest rate, which is the 
nominal interest rate minus inflation, and (4) spot prices for Brent Crude oil.3 
Data for wealth and price of oil has manually been adjusted for inflation (2013 prices) and 
seasonally adjusted via R interface to X-13ARIMA-SEATS, while data for disposable income 
and consumption was initially adjusted for inflation (2013 prices) and seasonally adjusted. In 
an attempt to capture the fluctuations of the interest rate and price of oil and its effect on 
households, quarterly data for these variables mirror the average value of each quarter, rather 
than the end value. All data for consumption, income and wealth data are denominated in 
Swedish krona. Furthermore, prices of oil are also converted into the same currency to 
mitigate any exchange rate related effect. 
4.2 Method 
Rather than only letting the forecast variable depend on the predictor variables, applying a 
VAR model will allow us to consider the situation where all variables affect each other. For 
instance, consider a situation where the government issues a stimulus package to increase 
consumption: if successful, the economy as a whole will be stimulated, thus increasing the 
general income level, which in turn causes a further increase in consumption. There is 
therefore reason to assume that also consumption should be included as a predictor variable. 
This is one of the virtues of VAR models: all variables are treated as endogenous. Another 
advantage of the VAR model is the analytical tools associated with it, such as Granger 
                                                          
2 Due to that it was only possible to obtain data for “wealth” as far back as the first quarter of 1980 stretching 
to the fourth quarter of 2013; the sample period used in this study has been limited to this time period. 
3 Data for consumption, disposable income, real interest rate and price of oil have been obtained with the help 
of Thomson Reuters Datastream Professional. However, the original sources for each variable are all from 
Oxford Economics, except spot prices for oil, which originates from ICIS Pricing. Furthermore, these variables 
will from now on simply be referred to as income, wealth, interest rate and oil prices. 
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causality test, impulse response function and forecast error variance decomposition. 
Additionally, all statistical computing has been conducted with R, where packages “vars” and 
“tseries” has mainly been used.4 
4.3 Model 
In a VAR model, the term autoregressive is due to the presence of the lagged value of the 
dependent variable, in our case consumption, on the right-hand side, and vector is basically 
due to the fact that we are dealing with a vector of two or more, in our case five, variables. 
For the moment, we will assume that each equation contains k lag values of each independent 
variable: consumption (C), income (I), wealth (W), interest rate (R) and the price of oil (O). 
Hence, an estimation of the model equation used in this study (by OLS) is as follows:    
∆𝐶𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗∆𝐶𝑡−𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1
∆𝐼𝑡−𝑗 + ∑ 𝜔𝑗∆𝑊𝑡−𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝜃𝑗∆𝑅𝑡−𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝜌𝑗∆𝑂𝑡−𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝑡 
where the stochastic error term, or impulse in the language of VAR, is denoted by 𝜀. Thus, it 
represents all of the variation in consumption that cannot be explained by the included 
independent variables. However, before an estimation of the above equation is made; it is 
vital that we examine the data at hand more carefully. To do so, a visual plot of the data is 
typically the first step when analyzing time series. It is also common practice to present the 
log of a time series to get an indication of the growth rate, but also to help induce 
homoscedasticity and normally distributed errors. Thus, all figures presented below have been 
plotted by taking the natural logarithm of each time series.  
At first glance, the time series for wealth, income and consumption in Figure 2 and 3 clearly 
illustrates the adverse shock that the Swedish economy experienced in the beginning of the 
1990s. Former governor of the Swedish Riksbank, Urban Bäckström (1997), explains that 
asset prices decreased substantially during the beginning of the financial crisis. This was in 
turn followed by an increase in the aggregate unemployment rate and a drop in total GDP of 6 
percent between 1990 and 1993. Furthermore, the trend lines in Figure 2 and 3 seem to be 
“trending upward”, although some fluctuations. In other words, they seem to exhibit non-
stationary properties, more specifically, a random walk model with drift. Figure 4 and 5 seem 
to exhibit a different non-stationary property, namely random walk model without drift.  
                                                          
4 R version 3.1.2 (2014-10-31). 
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Figure 2 and 3. Logarithm of Wealth, Income (blue line) and Consumption (orange line). 
  
Figure 5. Logarithm of Interest Rate.5 
 
Figure 6. Logarithm of Oil Prices. 
 
                                                          
5 Due to negative values for the first (-1,01), second (-0,4) and third quarter (-0,66) of the year 1980, these 
values were replaced by the mean value for the period 1980-1981 (0,7225) prior to being logged. 
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It is of paramount importance that we determine that all data is stationary, I(0), before we 
continue, due to that non-stationary time series used in a regression model might result in 
spurious regression, where t-statistics, p-values and overall measures of fit become 
misleading. To test whether the time series variables are non-stationary, i.e. unit root test, we 
perform an augmented Dickey-Fuller test on the data. The test results indicate that the time 
series for wealth, income and consumption, as well as oil prices and interest rate, are indeed 
non-stationary (see Table 1 in Appendix A).6 Hence, the time series variables needs to be 
transformed from non-stationary to stationary. Since the first difference of a random walk 
time series, with or without drift, is stationary, we can easily perform the transformation, such 
that, for instance, 𝐶𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡−1 = ∆𝐶𝑡. We establish that all the time series have been integrated 
by order of 1, I(1) before we continue (see Table 2 in Appendix A). This time, the performed 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test implies that the data is stationary at significance level 0.10. 
Though, as a result of the transformation, one observation has been “lost” for each variable. 
Also, as noted by Gujarati and Porter (2009, p. 788), it is important to remember that a VAR 
solely in first differences might “forget” potentially important stationary variables and 
therefore estimated coefficients may suffer from omitted variables bias, i.e., the model might 
compensate for the missing variable by over- or underestimating the effect of the included 
variables. 
As mentioned earlier, regression of a non-stationary time series on another non-stationary 
time series might result in spurious regression. However, if the time series share a common 
trend, the regression of one time series on the other(s) might not necessarily be spurious. In 
other words, if the time series are individually I(1), but their linear combination is I(0), then 
we can say that the variables are assumed to be cointegrated, i.e. they share a common 
stochastic drift. Economically speaking, this implies that variables who are cointegrated have 
a long-term equilibrium between them. Hence, the aspect of cointegration could help to 
determine whether to use a vector error-correction model (VECM) or not.7 To determine 
whether the variables are cointegrated or not, the Engle-Granger test for cointegration will be 
applied. It requires running a standard OLS regression of the variables, saving the residuals 
and then running an augmented Dickey-Fuller test on the residuals to determine if it is I(0). 
                                                          
6 However, since most economic models predicts the real interest rate to be stationary, see Cheung (2011, p. 
130); the non-stationary ADF result for the real interest rate is most likely due to the relatively small sample. 
Also, one must remember the limitations of most unit root tests: they are, for example and most important in 
our case, weak at “catching” structural breaks in time series, see Gujarati and Porter (2009, s. 759). 
7 A VECM is a VAR model with an error correction term included. This is, for instance, useful for estimating both 
short-term and long-term effects of one time series on another.    
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The results from Table 3 imply that at significance level 0.05, we cannot reject the hypothesis 
of non-stationarity of the residuals, even though the low p-value seem to indicate on some 
cointegration.8 This does not imply that there is no significant relationship amongst the 
variables. It merely implies that all the variables do not necessarily move together in the long-
run, i.e. there may still exist a significant relationship between the variables in the short-run. 
For this reason, we determine that a VECM is not required in this case, and thus a regression 
with only the first differenced lagged variables are to be included in the model.       
Table 3. Augmented Dickey-Fuller test on residuals from OLS regression. 𝑯𝟎 = non-stationary. 
Dickey-Fuller Lag order P-value 
-3.3929 5 0.05874 
       
Finally, we must determine the optimal lag length for the estimated VAR model. We perform 
a test of four different models, AIC, HQ, SC and FPE.9 Based on different lag lengths and on 
the sample size the test returns an estimation of the optimal lag length according to each 
model. Due to that it seems reasonable that it may take more than a few months for 
international oil price fluctuations or interest rate adjustments to affect the consumption 
decisions of average Swedish households, for example the Riksbank (2011) estimates that a 
change in the repo rate has its greatest effect on inflation after one to two years; the maximum 
lag length for the executed test will be set to eight. Hence, all the of the regressions leading to 
the numbers in the table are estimated for a sample beginning in the first quarter of 1982, i.e. 
the earliest date for which eight lags are available. The results (see Table 4 in Appendix A) 
suggest that criteria HQ and SC support a lag length of one and the other two, AIC and SPE, 
support a lag length of four. This “preference” is indicated by the lowest value relative to 
other lags for each model respectively. Due to that our theory assumes that certain changes 
that affect the economy, especially oil price fluctuations and the interest rate, may take more 
time than a quarter to affect the consumption decisions of households, and also due to that 
studies indicate that AIC and FPE are recommended for the estimation of autoregressive lag 
length for smaller samples, see Liew (2004); it seems reasonable to compute a VAR model 
with four lags. 
                                                          
8 For instance, It is usually assumed that consumption, income and wealth are to some extent cointegrated, see 
Gujarati and Porter (2009, s. 762). 
9 Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Hannan–Quinn Information Criterion (HQ), Schwarz Information Criterion 
(SC), and Akaike's Final Prediction Error Criterion (FPE). 
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4.4 Results 
Table 5. VAR estimates based on 4 lags. Sample size: 131 observations. 
T statistics in [ ]. Significance codes: * (<0.05) and - (<0.1). 
 Consumption Income 
Consumption (-1) -0.0402 [-0.432] -0.0653 [-0.448] 
Income (-1) -0.0755 [-1.328] -0.2023 [-2.278] * 
Wealth (-1) -0.0081 [-0.239] -0.0153 [-0.289] 
Interest rate (-1) -0.0006 [0.300] 0.0002 [0.076] 
Oil (-1) -0.0080 [-1.174] -0.0070 [-0.652] 
Consumption (-2) 0.1078 [1.176] 0.3160 [2.207] * 
Income (-2) -0.0845 [-1.486) -0.3594 [-4.044] * 
Wealth (-2) -0.0087 [-0.212) -0.0026 [-0.040] 
Interest rate (-2) -0.0047 [-2.531] * -0.0017 [-0.584] 
Oil (-2) 0.0039 [0.569] 0.0177 [1.669] - 
Consumption (-3) 0.1308 [1.432] 0.1202 [0.842]  
Income (-3) -0.0560 [-0.946] -0.1609 [-1.741] - 
Wealth (-3) 0.0141 [0.356] -0.0452 [-0.731] 
Interest rate (-3) 0.0016 [0.884] -0.0003 [-0.110] 
Oil (-3) -0.0042 [-0.591] -0.0106 [0.945] 
Consumption (-4) -0.0810 [-0.835] -0.0706 [-0.466] 
Income (-4) -0.0190 [-0.327] 0.3838 [4.224] * 
Wealth (-4) 0.0216 [0.634] -0.0051 [-0.096] 
Interest rate (-4) -0.0022 [-1.135] -0.0050 [-1.630] 
Oil (-4) -0.0089 [-1.271] 0.0146 [1.325] 
Constant 0.0047 [3.561]* 0.0045 [2.187] * 
 
The results in Table 5 illustrates the estimated VAR coefficients and t statistics for both 
consumption and income as dependent variables. The reason for including the estimates for 
income is because of its assumed close relationship to consumption, i.e. anything affecting 
income will to some extent affect consumption. Furthermore, since the preceding equations are 
OLS regressions, the output in the table is to be interpreted as usual. Thus, the estimated VAR 
where consumption is the dependent variable implies that none of the estimated coefficients for 
oil are statistically significant. The VAR where income acts as dependent variable does however 
suggest the second lagged value for oil is statistically significant.  
However, since there are several lags of the same variables included in the model, each 
estimated coefficient will not be statistically significant. On the other hand, they might 
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collectively be significant on the basis of the standard F test. Table 6 implies that, given the 
data and according to the F statistic, only the VAR model where income is the dependent 
variable has at least one predictor with a non-zero coefficient, at significance level 0.05. This 
implies that only the “income”-model seems to have predictive power. It is peculiar that the 
previous estimated “consumption”-model does show that none of the lagged income predictors 
are statistically significant. Even though the variables other than oil price are merely control 
variables in the model, there should in any case be a statistical significant relationship between 
income and consumption. Though, since the model itself is significant at significance level 0.10, 
the “lack” of significant predictors in the estimated model might be due to the presence of 
multicollinearity.     
Table 6. Regression analysis for VAR based on four lags. 
 Consumption Income 
𝐑𝟐 0.2156 0.4686 
𝐀𝐝𝐣. 𝐑𝟐 0.073 0.3719 
F statistic 1.512 on 20 and 110 DF 4.849 on 20 and 110 DF 
P-value 0.09134 2.893e-08 
 
Continually, one has to keep in mind that all measurement processes cause certain amount of 
random variations in the data; a phenomenon called “noise”. A common problem with noise in 
time series data is the difficulty of capturing the important patterns of the data. As a result, 
fitting a model to noisy data increases the risk of “overfitting” the data, i.e. increasing the 
probability that the random variations in the data will have too much influence on parameter 
estimates, which can result in an inaccurate model. Observing the figures based on the 
differentiated data (see Figures 7-9 in Appendix B): there seems indeed to be a lot of noise 
present in the data. To reduce the noise, or “smooth” out, and thus highlighting longer-term 
trends, we can compute a series of averages of different subsets of the full data set for each 
variable, i.e. a moving average. Consequently, this noise-reducing technique will undoubtedly 
reduce our data set, especially the larger the subset becomes. Thus, to capture the yearly 
fluctuations of the data, to fortify the smoothing of the data, and at the same time keeping the 
reduction of the data set at minimal: the moving averages have been computed with an interval 
of four. As a result the data now ranges from 1981-2013. Figure 10 illustrates an example of 
the difference between the “noisy” and the noise-reduced data using the variable for wealth (see 
Figures 11-13 in Appendix B for remaining variables). 
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Figure 10. Difference between “noisy” (left graph) and smooth (right graph) data for variable Wealth.  
  
As previously, we perform a test to determine amount of lags to include in the model (see Table 
7 in Appendix A), which indicates that the optimal lag length for the model is seven. One must 
though keep in mind that a problem with including too many lagged terms for a relative small 
sample, apart from consuming degrees of freedom, is that it might introduce the possibility of 
multicollinearity. We compute a VAR model with seven lags, based on the noise-reduced data, 
where consumption is again the dependent variable (see Table 8 for regression analysis and 
Table 9 for coefficient estimates). This model does not only seem to imply that at least one of 
the predictors has a non-zero coefficient, i.e. the model is significant at the 0.01 significance 
level, but also that all the estimates for oil, except the fourth and seventh lagged value, are 
statistically significant. 
Table 8. Regression analysis for VAR on consumption based on seven lags. Smoothed data. 
𝐑𝟐 0.7898 
𝐀𝐝𝐣. 𝐑𝟐 0.7071 
F statistic 9.554 on 35 and 89 DF 
P-value < 2.2e-16 
 
The estimated coefficient do, however, send mixed signals. At some points, an increase in the 
price of oil is associated with a decrease in consumption, and some others an increase in 
consumption. This ambiguous result displays what is a common criticism of VAR models: 
since every variable is assumed to influence all the other variables in the model, it makes 
direct interpretation of the estimated coefficients complicated.  
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Table 9. VAR estimates for consumption based on 3 lags. Sample size: 129 observations. 
T statistics in [ ]. Significance codes: * (<0.05) and - (<0.1). Smoothed data. 
Consumption (-1) 0.7947 [7.329] * 
Income (-1) -0.0501 [-0.619] 
Wealth (-1) -0.0159 [-0.408] 
Interest rate (-1) -0.0013 [-0.522] 
Oil (-1) -0.0154 [-2.008] * 
Consumption (-2) 0.1959 [1.454] 
Income (-2) -0.1279 [-1.421] 
Wealth (-2) 0.0030 [0.040] 
Interest rate (-2) -0.0050 [-1.637] 
Oil (-2) 0.0240 [2.175] * 
Consumption (-3) -0.0613 [-0.479] 
Income (-3) 0.0997 [1.097] 
Wealth (-3) 0.0502 [0.742] 
Interest rate (-3) 0.0061 [2.003] * 
Oil (-3) -0.0212 [-1.860] - 
Consumption (-4) -0.5539 [-4.766] * 
Income (-4) 0.0841 [0.919] 
Wealth (-4) -0.0027 [-0.041] 
Interest rate (-4) -0.0016 [-0.622] 
Oil (-4) 0.0083 [0.771] 
Consumption (-5) 0.3715 [2.955] * 
Income (-5) 0.1115 [1.215] 
Wealth (-5) -0.0720 [-1.037] 
Interest rate (-5) -0.0009 [-0.339] 
Oil (-5) -0.0258 [-2.180] * 
Consumption (-6) 0.2181 [1.682] - 
Income (-6) -0.1703 [-1.911] - 
Wealth (-6) 0.0442 [0.586] 
Interest rate (-6) -0.0014 [-0.531] 
Oil (-6) 0.0296 [2.458] * 
Consumption (-7) -0.2121 [-2.062] * 
Income (-7) 0.0719 [0.868] 
Wealth (-7) 0.0089 [0.221] 
Interest rate (-7) 0.0011 [0.468] 
Oil (-7) -0.0133 [-1.551] 
Constant 0.0009 [1.757] - 
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Despite the above mentioned problem, the model itself can still be useful since it allows for 
testing of Granger causality test, impulse response function and forecast error variance 
decomposition. However, before we continue with mentioned tests, it is important to consider 
the validity of the estimated VAR model by testing for both stability and autocorrelation of the 
residuals. If the stability condition is not satisfied, then any "shock" to the variable of interest 
will not “die out”, hence computing impulse response functions and forecast error variance 
decompositions would be futile. Testing for autocorrelation of the residuals is also of great 
importance, since any autocorrelation would suggest that there is vital information in the model 
that has not been accounted for. In essence, this would imply an inapt model.  
We can assess the stability of the VAR model by computing the eigenvalues of the coefficient 
matrix. If values are 1 or greater than 1; then the VAR is determined unstable. The computed 
eigenvalues (see Table 10 in Appendix A) display that even though some values are close to 1, 
none of them are equal or above one. In other words, all values are within the unit circle and 
we can determine that the VAR is relatively stable. We continue by performing a Portmanteau 
test for the joint hypothesis of no autocorrelation of the residuals. Amount of lags to be tested, 
h, should exceed amount of lags included in the model, however, one should keep in mind that 
for large values of h the test becomes less reliable. Thus, since our sample is relatively small, 
we will set the number of lags to be tested to 25. The results from the test in Table 11 indicate 
that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation of the residuals.  
Table 11. Portmanteau test, where 𝑯𝟎 = no autocorrelation of the residuals.  
Data: Residuals of VAR  Chi-squared = 487.2485 DF = 450 P-value = 0.1092 
 
VAR models themselves do not allow us to make statements about causal relationship, 
however, they do allow for interpretation about the dynamic relationship between the specified 
variables. Hence, to determine if oil prices and consumption affect one another over time, we 
can perform a Granger causality test using the estimated VAR. One should on the other hand 
note that Granger causality is a noticeably weaker argument than normal causality.  
Table 12. Causality test: 𝑯𝟎 = Oil does not Granger-cause Consumption, Income, Wealth or Interest rate. 
F-Test = 2.8008 DF1 = 28 DF2 = 445 P-value = 4.565e-05 
 
The results from the test is presented in Table 12 and implies that there is strong evidence that 
lagged oil prices helps predict consumption, income, wealth and interest rate in Sweden, i.e. it 
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is assumed that oil prices Granger-causes the other variables. However, this type of test does 
not necessarily tell us the complete story about the interaction between oil prices and the other 
variables, especially consumption, which is the variable of interest. It can therefore be of 
interest to observe the response of one variable to an impulse in other variable, i.e. impulse 
response function. To do this, we compute a test where we impose a positive, structural shock 
on oil prices and plot the response of consumption. Due to the relative stability of the estimated 
VAR model and its ambiguous estimated coefficients, it would not only be very complicated 
but also “unfair” to draw numerical conclusions from Figure 14. It does, however, clearly imply 
that one standard deviation positive shock in the price of oil is subsequently followed by a 
negative response in consumption. This negative response in consumption reaches its peak at 
about ninth quarters after the initial oil price shock to the economy. The effect seems to linger 
for longer than the amount of lagged values that were included in the model. This could imply 
that the amount of time for shifting oil prices to reach “full effect” on consumption might 
demand a more stretched time period than what was previously expected.  
Figure 14. Orthogonal impulse response from Oil.10 
 
The forecast error variance decomposition determines the amount of the forecast error variance 
of each of the variables that can be explained by exogenous shocks to the other variables. In 
other words, it is an indication of how much information each variable contributes to the other 
variables in the VAR model at a given horizon. Due to that we already set the lag length to 
seven in our model, and that two years seems to be a reasonable amount of time for changing 
                                                          
10 However, one must keep in mind that the results of an orthogonal IRF can depend on the order of variables, 
especially if highly correlated.  
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oil to effect consumption, we start by setting the horizon (n) to eight quarters. The result of the 
test are illustrated below in Table 13 (note that only every second quarter is presented).  
Table 13. Forecast error variance decomposition for n = 8. 
 Consumption Income Wealth Interest rate Oil 
n = 2 0.97 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 
n = 4 0.91 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.02 
n = 6 0.85 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.06 
n = 8 0.75 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.14 
 
The results in Table 13 display that the impact of the price of oil on consumption seems to be 
increasing almost monotonically (with the exception between the second quarter and fourth 
quarter). The results show, at the eighth period, that approximately 14 percent of the variance 
of consumption are generated by the innovations of oil prices. Increasing the horizon to four 
years shows, not surprisingly, that the impact of oil on consumption increases as well. At the 
16th period, approximately 19 percent of the variance of consumption are generated by the 
innovations of oil prices (see Table 14 in Appendix A). According to this model, and the tests 
conducted on it, oil price increases clearly seem to affect consumption negatively.    
To determine if oil price fluctuations still has a significant impact on the consumption of 
Swedish households compared to in the 1980s and early 1990s, we will divide the data into two 
parts. The first part contains data which ranges from the first quarter of 1980 to the second 
fourth of 1996, and the second part ranges from the first quarter of 1997 to the fourth quarter 
of 2013. One could argue that, assuming oil dependency had a larger effect on the Swedish 
economy before than today, the effect of oil price changes might have lingered on until the late 
1990s, even early 2000s. However, due to the risk of making one of the samples of data 
significantly smaller than the other, it seems more appropriate to divide the data into two equal 
parts. As previously, to be able to compare the results, we will estimate two VAR models that 
are based on the original data, and two VAR models that are based on the noise-reduced data.11  
We perform a test to determine the amount of lagged values to include. A majority of the results 
indicate that a large amount of lagged values should be used for all four VAR models (see Table 
15 in Appendix A). However, due to the fact that the sample size is significantly smaller when 
divided into two parts compared to previous estimation, sample size is now equal to 66 
                                                          
11 Hence, the two noise-reduced data series ranges from 1981Q1-1997Q3 and 1997Q4-2013Q4.  
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observations, including too many lagged terms will, as noted above, consume degrees of 
freedom and increase the chance of multicollinearity. On the other hand, including too few 
might lead to specification errors, i.e. when at least one independent variable is correlated with 
the error term. For this reason, and attempting to capture the short-run effects, the amount of 
lagged values will be set to four. 
Table 18. Regression analysis for VARs on consumption based on four lags. Smoothed data. 
 1981Q1-1997Q2 1997Q3-2013Q4 
𝐑𝟐 0.7657 0.7974 
𝐀𝐝𝐣. 𝐑𝟐 0.6514 0.6986 
F statistic 6.699 on 20 and 41 DF 8.07 on 20 and 41 DF 
P-value 1.493e-07 1.064e-08 
 
Table 19. VAR estimates based on 4 lags. Sample size: 62 observations. 
T statistics in [ ]. Significance codes: * (<0.05) and - (<0.1). Smoothed data. 
 1981Q1-1997Q2 1997Q3-2013Q4 
Consumption (-1) 0.4559 [2.704] * 0.6401 [3.623] * 
Income (-1) -0.2041 [-1.497] 0.0030 [0.026] 
Wealth (-1) -0.0146 [-0.262] 0.1232 [2.063] * 
Interest rate (-1) -0.0004 [-0.119] -0.0075 [-2.475] * 
Oil (-1) -0.0303 [-2.544] * -0.0276 [-2.599] * 
Consumption (-2) 0.2009 [1.135] 0.0432 [0.204] 
Income (-2) -0.1620 [-1.107] 0.0779 [0.600] 
Wealth (-2) 0.0104 [0.121] 0.0081 [0.100] 
Interest rate (-2) -0.0047 [-1.313] 0.0021 [0.562] 
Oil (-2) 0.0053 [0.377] 0.0283 [1.830] - 
Consumption (-3) 0.0060 [0.033] 0.3412 [1.612] 
Income (-3) 0.0949 [0.641] -0.0589 [-0.427] 
Wealth (-3) -0.0828 [-0.702] -0.0673 [-0.842] 
Interest rate (-3) 0.0081 [2.414] * -0.0031 [-0.938] 
Oil (-3) -0.0129 [-0.922] -0.0212 [-1.317] 
Consumption (-4) -0.3031 [-2.188] * -0.0287 [-0.154] 
Income (-4) 0.1199 [0.867] 0.2658 [1.969] - 
Wealth (-4) 0.0885 [1.460] 0.0311 [0.552] 
Interest rate (-4) -0.0006[-0.200] -0.0043 [-1.443] 
Oil (-4) -0.0170 [-1.361] -0.0047 [-0.426] 
Constant 0.0015 [2.343] * -0.0034 [-1.921] - 
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The four estimated VAR models share the same pattern as previously: those that are estimated 
based on original data’s (see Table 16 and 17 in Appendix A) F statistic imply that none of the 
models have a statistically significant non-zero predictor. However, Table 18 indicate that in 
the noise-reduced models at least one of the predictors is statistically significant (at significance 
level 0.01), and is thus the models that will be used for further analysis. Observing the estimated 
coefficients in Table 19, we see that in both models, i.e. 1981Q1-1997Q2 and 1997Q3-2013Q4, 
show the first lagged value for oil is statistically significant at level 0.05. The latter model does 
show that the second lagged value for oil is also significant at level 0.1. Both coefficients 
indicate on a negative impact on consumption. For instance, if one was to compare the 
coefficient estimates with each other, a 1 percent increase in the price of oil is, if all else equal, 
associated with an approximately 3 percent decrease in consumption for the period 1981Q1-
1997Q2 compared to an approximately 2.8 decrease for the period 1997Q3-2013Q4. However, 
as mentioned earlier, this numerical conclusions are not “fair”, and thus further tests need to be 
conducted. Note that the following tests are thus based on the smoothed data. 
Before we continue by looking at the Granger causality, impulse response functions and 
forecast error variance decomposition of both estimated VAR models, we need to consider their 
validity. In other words, similar to before, we need to confirm for both stability and 
autocorrelation of the residuals. Looking at the eigenvalues for both VARs (see Table 20 and 
21 in Appendix A), we can clearly see that some values are close to 1, however none of the 
values are equal or greater than 1, therefore we can conclude that both VAR models are to be 
considered stable. We continue by performing a Portmanteau test for the joint hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation of the residuals.         
Table 22. Portmanteau test, where 𝑯𝟎 = no autocorrelation of the residuals.    
 1981Q1-1997Q2 1997Q3-2013Q4 
Chi-squared 327.0215 331.834 
DF 300 300 
P-value 0.136 0.1027 
 
The results in Table 21 show us that we cannot reject the hypothesis of no autocorrelation of 
the residuals. Thus, we can now continue by looking at the Granger causality of oil prices in 
both VAR models. The results in Table 21 imply that we can reject the hypothesis that Oil does 
not Granger-cause, consumption, income, wealth or interest rate, at significance level 0.05. In 
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other words, the price of oil is useful when forecasting values for consumption, income, wealth 
and interest rate in both models. 
Table 23. Causality test: 𝑯𝟎 = Oil does not Granger-cause Consumption, Income, Wealth or Interest rate. 
1981Q1-1997Q2 1997Q3-2013Q4 
f-test=2.0405, df1=16, df2=205, p-value=0.01228 f-test=2.0911, df1=16, df2=205, p-value=0.00991 
 
Having determined that the price of oil does have some effect on the other variables for both 
time periods, we now compute a test where we impose a positive, structural shock on oil prices 
and plot the response of consumption for both models. Figure 15 shows that a one positive 
standard deviation shock to the price of oil is again followed by a negative response in 
consumption. This negative response peaks in both cases at about the fifth quarter after the 
initial shock. The reaction between the fourth and fifth quarter is however much “steeper” in 
the “earlier” model relative to the “later” model, i.e. it seems as an increase in the price of oil 
has a larger, negative effect in 1981Q1-1997Q2 relative to 1997Q3-2013Q4. Also, the effects 
seems to stretch much further than merely four quarters. 
Figure 15. Orthogonal impulse response from Oil, where VAR model 1981Q1-1997Q2 is shown by the left 
diagram and 1997Q3-2013Q4 is shown by the right diagram. 
 
As before, it can be useful to also observe the forecast error variance decomposition for the 
two estimated models. The horizon period is set to 16, that is four years, however this time 
only the impact of oil on consumption is presented in the table. 
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Table 24. Forecast error variance decomposition for n = 16.  
 1981Q1-1997Q2 1997Q3-2013Q4 
n = 2 0.07 0.07 
n = 4 0.13 0.14 
n = 6 0.25 0.21 
n = 8 0.23 0.21 
n = 10 0.22 0.18 
n = 12 0.21 0.18 
n = 14 0.21 0.18 
n = 16 0.20 0.17 
 
Table 23 shows that for the second and fourth period the variance of consumption generated 
by the innovations of oil prices are larger in the 1997Q3-2013Q4 data. However, at later 
periods it is the complete opposite. We can for example observe that at the 16th period the 
variance of consumption attributed to oil is approximately 20 percent in the “earlier” model, 
while it is approximately 17 percent in the “later” model. This indicates that the amount of 
forecast error variance of the variable for consumption accounted for by exogenous shocks to 
oil prices is larger for the time period 1981Q1-1997Q2 relative to 1997Q3-2013Q4. 
5. Conclusion 
Oil is undoubtedly essential to modern life and economic development, as well as an 
important and strategic resource. For that reason, changes in international oil prices have a 
significant impact on the global economic activity. This impact can be different from country 
to country due to various reasons, such as the differing levels of scale and economic 
development. As a result of the significant impact and useful forecasting value of this critical 
natural resource on the economic development, the subject has been studied by a vast amount 
of scholars and professionals ever since the oil crisis of 1973. Its relevance is still imperative, 
particularly considering recent development of international oil prices, which have steadily 
declined since mid-2014. Though, studies that focus particularly on the impact on consumer 
spending have been considerably scarcer.  
Using quarterly data from the sample period 1980-2013, this study applies a vector 
autoregressive model (VAR) to determine the effect of an international oil price shock on 
household consumer spending in Sweden. The results from the estimated model, where 
income, wealth and interest rate are added as control variables, indicate that the price of oil 
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does significantly affect household consumption in Sweden, and that a positive oil price shock 
causes a significant decrease in consumption. These findings are in agreement with previous 
studies made on the subject. 
The results also seem to indicate that the impact on household consumption due to an oil price 
shock can take more than a year to reach full effect, and that the impact itself may linger on 
for more than two years. Oil price shocks are assumed to affect household consumption 
through such channels as the real balance effect and wealth transfer effect. However, due to 
that it seems reasonable to also assume that the negative impact of an oil price shock on 
household consumption, via declining disposable income for the oil-importing country, ought 
to require a longer time period than merely two years, this short-run effect is perhaps 
essentially caused by the real balance effect. For instance, the airline industry can quite easily 
adopt its pricing level after observing the fluctuations of international oil prices, and the 
Riksbank can prepare for a period of deflation, caused by declining oil prices, by reducing the 
repo rate. Both of these examples should have a more instant effect on consumer spending, as 
relative to a fall in disposable income caused by a wealth transfer from oil-importers to oil-
exporters.    
In addition, due to Sweden’s continuing attempts of reducing its oil dependency and carbon-
emission, a further purpose of this study is also to determine if an international oil price shock 
has a lesser impact on the consumption of Swedish households today relative to prior the mid-
1990s. The results on this matter are more complicated to determine, even though both 
showed that oil prices does significantly affect the other variables, including consumption. 
One can, however, when the estimated models are compared, observe a slight indication of a 
lesser negative effect on consumption, caused by an oil price shock, today relative to before. 
Though, recall that even if Sweden would decrease its oil dependency to a significantly lower 
level, thus minimizing the real balance effect from rising oil prices; oil price shocks could still 
cause an adverse effect in consumption. For instance, consider an oil price shock that causes a 
rise in the general pricing level for countries from which Sweden imports necessary 
commodities and products. Due to imported inflation, prices of goods made domestically 
increases as well, and sequentially through counter-inflationary monetary policy causes a 
decrease in Sweden’s level of consumption. This demonstrates the complex and several 
amount of ways for international oil price shocks to affect the global economic activity. It also 
demonstrates the complicated nature of estimating whether one can determine if the reduced 
oil dependency has dampened the effect on consumer spending caused by rising oil prices. 
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Furthermore, except discussing the results generated by the model, it is important to discuss 
the model itself. That is, even though the models are statistically significant on basis of an F 
test, and the price of oil is shown to have a significant impact on consumption, it is both 
peculiar and problematic that the variable for income did not exhibit any significant effect on 
consumption. Despite the fact the remaining variables are merely control variables to better 
estimate the effect of increasing oil prices on consumer spending, income does certainly have 
an impact on consumption. As mentioned earlier, it is common that not all lagged estimated 
coefficients in a VAR model are statistically significant. However, when none of the 
estimated coefficients, based on an independent variable that clearly has an impact on a 
dependent variable, are significant then it is an indication of an imperfect model. There could 
be several reasons for this non-significant result, from multicollinearity, omitted variable bias 
to insufficient sample period. It should nevertheless not simply be considered a setback, but 
an indication that further studies on the subject should be made. Perhaps using another model 
for estimation, different transformation of data, or complementing with further data to allow 
for an extended sample period might be a step in the right direction.  
With that said, it is still of interest to consider the policy implications of a situation where a 
reduced oil dependency has a dampening effect on oil prices impact on the economy. It is of 
no greater surprise that a “fossil-free” economy is a valuable goal itself, but also provided that 
an efficient and relative inexpensive substitute replaces fossil fuels. It is for this reason that 
increasing oil prices demonstrates a complicated and ambiguous problem: on one hand, it 
induces a reduced usage of fossil fuels and increases the demand of, for instance, renewable 
energy; on the other hand, it encourages unconventional oil production such as shale oil 
extraction, and therefore would not necessarily cause a global oil shortage. It is for this reason 
that recent development of plummeting oil prices, which have decreased steadily since mid-
2014, introduces an interesting situation. Obviously, the international oil prices cannot 
continue to fall at the same pace endlessly. It can, however, revolve around a relative low 
price level for a longer period of time. This is generally a positive situation for the global 
economic development, particularly large oil importers such as the U.S. or Japan. In contrast, 
even though the Swedish economy also benefits from this situation, the low oil prices could 
be counter-productive in terms of renewable energy, since it makes it more expensive relative 
to the consumption and extraction of fossil fuels. However, due to that fossil fuels are a finite 
resource, and that the awareness of renewable energy and its relative positive effects are 
increasing, this is evidently more of a short-run problem rather than a long-run problem. 
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This study has focused on the effect on household consumption caused by a positive shock to 
oil prices. It should therefore be noted that, considering the vast amount of studies conducted 
on the subject, these effects are not expected to be symmetrical. It is in other words assumed 
that rising oil prices have a greater effect on the global economy, and thus consumption, 
relative to the effects of falling oil prices. Then again, as mentioned in the introduction, 
studies of the effect on both GDP and household consumption in Sweden caused by the price 
of oil are very limited. It is for this reason imperative that further studies are to be performed. 
Considering that, once oil prices have “reached bottom”, prices must ultimately increase; it is 
crucial to understand the channels and extent of these effects on the Swedish economy. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Tables 
Table 1. Augmented Dickey-Fuller test results before integrated of order 1. 𝑯𝟎 = non-stationary. 
Data Dickey-Fuller Lag order P-value 
log.consumption -2.1132 5 0.5294 
log.income -2.3032 5 0.4504 
log.wealth -2.3561 5 0.4283 
log.rate  -2.7801 5 0.252 
log.oil -1.5514 5 0.7631 
 
Table 2. Augmented Dickey-Fuller test results after integrated of order 1. 𝑯𝟎 = non-stationary.  
Data Dickey-Fuller Lag order P-value 
diff.log.consumption -3.6297 5 0.03328 
diff.log.income -3.8654 5 0.01796 
diff.log.wealth -3.3125 5 0.07216 
diff.log.rate -6.8675 5 < 0.01 
diff.log.oil -5.4279 5 < 0.01 
 
Table 4. Output of different models for test of optimal lag length: 
 1 lag 2 lags 3 lags 4 lags 
AIC (n) -2.93e+01 -2.95e+01 -2.95e+01 -2.96e+01 
HQ (n) -2.90e+01 -2.90e+01 -2.88e+01 -2.86e+01 
SC (n) -2.86e+01 -2.82e+01 -2.77e+01 -2.72e+01 
FPE (n) 1.97e-13 1.60e-13 1.50e-13 1.47e-13 
 
 5 lag  6 lags 7 lags 8 lags 
AIC (n) -2.95e+01 -2.94e+01 -2.93e+01 -2.92e+01 
HQ (n) -2.83e+01 -2.80e+01 -2.76e+01 -2.73e+01 
SC (n) -2.66e+01 -2.60e+01 -2.52e+01 -2.46e+01 
FPE (n) 1.55e-13 1.74e-13 2.11e-13 2.35e-13 
 
Table 7.  Results of test of optimal lag length: 
AIC (n) HQ (n) SC (n) FPE (n) 
7 2 2 7 
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Table 10. Eigenvalues of the coefficient matrix (for VAR based on seven lags, smoothed data). 
[1] 0.94, [2] 0.94, [3] 0.93, [4] 0.93, [5] 0.91, [6] 0.91, [7] 0.91, [8] 0.91, [9] 0.89, [10] 0.89, [11] 0.89,  
[12] 0.89, [13] 0.88, [14] 0.88, [15] 0.88, [16] 0.87, [17] 0.87, [18] 0.85, [19] 0.85, [20] 0.83, [21] 0.83, 
[22] 0.83, [23] 0.83, [24] 0.82, [25] 0.82, [26] 0.82, [27] 0.82, [28] 0.77, [29] 0.77, [30] 0.73, [31] 0.73,  
[32] 0.42, [33] 0.42, [34] 0.42, [35] 0.42 
 
Table 14. Forecast error variance decomposition for n = 16. 
 Consumption Income Wealth Interest rate Oil 
n = 4 0.91 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.02 
n = 8 0.75 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.14 
n = 12 0.69 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.19 
n = 16 0.66 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.19 
 
Table 15. Output of four different models for test of optimal lag length. Smoothed data indicated by *. 
 AIC (n) HQ (n) SC (n) FPE (n) 
1980Q1-1996Q4 10 10 1 3 
1997Q1-2013Q3  10 10 10 10 
1981Q1-1997Q2* 10 10 10 10 
1997Q3-2013Q4* 10 10 10 10 
 
Table 16. VAR estimates based on 4 lags. Sample size: 63 observations. 
T statistics in [ ]. Significance codes: * (<0.05) and - (<0.1). 
 1980Q1-1996Q4 1997Q1-2013Q4 
Consumption (-1) -0.0724 [-0.502] -0.0391 [-0.207] 
Income (-1) -0.2228 [-2.235] * 0.0029 [0.025] 
Wealth (-1) -0.0057 [-0.089] 0.0263 [0.417] 
Interest rate (-1) 0.0016 [0.471] -0.0037 [-1.280] 
Oil (-1) -0.0196 [-1.553] -0.0140 [-1.361] 
Consumption (-2) 0.0679 [0.466] 0.0407 [0.223] 
Income (-2) -0.2301 [-2.236] * 0.0634 [0.576] 
Wealth (-2) -0.0183 [-0.192] 0.0745 [1.249] 
Interest rate (-2) -0.0049 [-1.552] -0.0014 [-0.512] 
Oil (-2) -0.0072 [-0.588] 0.0005 [0.048] 
Consumption (-3) -0.0380 [-0.257] 0.3119 [1.644] 
Income (-3) -0.1630 [-1.467] -0.0058 [-0.050] 
Wealth (-3) -0.0428 [-0.481] 0.0336 [0.597] 
Interest rate (-3) 0.0032 [1.036] -0.0021 [-0.757] 
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Oil (-3) -0.0178 [-1.365] -0.0127 [-1.126] 
Consumption (-4) -0.1615 [-1.077] 0.0624 [0.319] 
Income (-4) -0.1847 [-1.750] - 0.1366 [1.213] 
Wealth (-4) 0.0530 [0.835] 0.0279 [0.477] 
Interest rate (-4) -0.0008 [-0.265] -0.0016 [-0.512] 
Oil (-4) -0.0258 [-1.959] - -0.0043 [-0.421] 
Constant 0.0043 [2.357] * -0.0006 [-0.186] 
 
Table 17. Regression analysis for VARs (from Table 14) on consumption based on four lags. 
 1980Q1-1996Q4 1997Q1-2013Q4 
𝐑𝟐 0.3711 0.2696 
𝐀𝐝𝐣. 𝐑𝟐 0.07157 -0.07826 
F statistic 1.239 on 20 and 42 DF 0.775 on 20 and 42 DF 
P-value 0.2725 0.7263 
 
Table 20. Eigenvalues of the coefficient matrix (for VAR 1981Q1-1997Q2). 
[1] 0.94 [2] 0.94 [3] 0.92 [4] 0.92 [5] 0.91 [6] 0.91 [7] 0.89 [8] 0.89 [9] 0.86 [10] 0.86 [11] 0.83 
[12] 0.83 [13] 0.75 [14] 0.75 [15] 0.72 [16] 0.72 [17] 0.56 [18] 0.56 [19] 0.37 [20] 0.09 
 
Table 21. Eigenvalues of the coefficient matrix (for VAR 1997Q3-2013Q4). 
[1] 0.95 [2] 0.95 [3] 0.89 [4] 0.88 [5] 0.88 [6] 0.85 [7] 0.85 [8] 0.81 [9] 0.81 [10] 0.76 [11] 0.76 
[12] 0.75 [13] 0.75 [14] 0.71 [15] 0.71 [16] 0.70 [17] 0.70 [18] 0.57 [19] 0.57 [20] 0.39 
 
Appendix B: Figures 
Figure 7. Income (blue line) and Consumption (orange line) integrated by order of 1.  
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Figure 8. Oil prices integrated by order of 1. 
 
Figure 9. Interest rate integrated by order of 1. 
 
Figure 11. Smoothed data for Income (blue line) and Consumption (orange line). 
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Figure 12. Smoothed data for Oil prices. 
 
Figure 13. Smoothed data for Interest rate. 
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